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CORPORATE GOVERNANCE THEORY AND REVIEW OF BOARD
DECISIONS
Christopher M. Bruner
Prevailing theories of corporate governance advance strikingly different
claims regarding the desirable balance of power within, and underlying purpose
of, the enterprise. Accordingly, they prompt strikingly different predictions
regarding how, and subject to what standards, shareholders may challenge board
decisions.
Shareholder Primacy favors strong shareholder powers and exclusive focus
on their interests.' This conception leads one to predict ample opportunity not
merely to second-guess board decisions procedurally but to interfere with them
substantively.
Director Primacy agrees that generating shareholder wealth is paramount
but favors the efficiency of board-centric governance. This conception leads
one to predict no opportunity for shareholder interference with substantive
board decisions, but perhaps limited opportunity to second-guess them
procedurally, with restrained judicial review distinguishing the latter from the
former.
Team Production resembles Director Primacy in favoring board-centric
governance but predicates this on a different conception of corporate purpose,
styling the board as a "mediating hierarch" charged with coordinating various
constituencies' contributions to production. This role requires subordination of
each constituency's interests to a broader duty owed to the enterprise.3 This
conception naturally leads one to predict sharply constrained opportunity for
shareholders to challenge board decisions and a correlatively skeptical judicial
posture in the face of such efforts.
How do these theories and predictions fare descriptively? The figure
below arrays illustrative forms of review under Delaware corporate law from
lesser to greater intensity. These range from preclusion of substantive review
under the business judgment rule; to intermediate review of takeover defenses,
involving a proportionality inquiry permitting target boards to consider
nonshareholder interests as long as rationally related shareholder benefits can be
1. See generally Lucian A- Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675
(2007).
2. See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate
Governance, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 547 (2003).
3. See generally Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85
VA. L. REv. 247 (1999).
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identified; to probing review of conflicts, requiring directors to establish the
transaction's fairness; to limited forms of self-help, permitting shareholders to
respond directly to disagreeable board conduct without resort to courts. The
latter category includes veto power over board-proposed fundamental actions and
authority to adopt, amend or repeal bylaws-raising the theoretical possibility of
repealing board-adopted bylaws or otherwise constraining board power.
FIGURE 1. Intensity of Review (Delaware) and Theoretical Implications
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On balance, none of the foregoing theories provides a compelling
descriptive account.'
Director Primacy favors board discretion yet struggles with the board's
practical capacity to deviate from shareholder interests and the shareholders'
capacity for autonomous action.
Team Production favors the combination of strong board powers with
express regard for nonshareholders in takeovers. Yet, discretion to consider
nonshareholders falls well short of the stakeholder mandate that a true
mediating hierarch requires. The shareholders' capacity to discipline the board
through autonomous action further contradicts the team production account.
Shareholder Primacy encounters challenges across the spectrum.
Substantial board discretion plainly contradicts the shareholder-centric ideals of
power and purpose alike, and the shareholders' capacity for autonomous
action-though real-remains sharply circumscribed. Shareholders may veto
fundamental actions but cannot initiate them, and emerging case law suggests
4. See generally CHRISTOPHER M. BRUNER, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE COMMON-
LAW WORLD: THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF SHAREHOLDER POWER 36-65 (2013).
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that board governance authority trumps the shareholders' bylaw authority when
the two substantively conflict.
Ultimately, there is no clear winner-a reality crystalized in Delaware's
ambiguous formulation of fiduciary duty, owed "to the corporation and its
stockholders" simultaneously.' This formulation remains the great Rohrschach
of our field-whatever one wants to think about corporate purpose can be
found here.
The normative question is whether strict adherence to any pure theory
would prove beneficial. I think not. The social and economic roles of the
public corporation are so diverse and far-reaching that we cannot expect any
singular conception to serve us well in all contexts. Delaware corporate law's
ambivalence regarding power and purpose reflects the need for flexibility to
tailor our working theory of the corporation-and the standards by which board
decisions are judged-to varying circumstances.
If any single criterion can explain what we observe, it is sustainability-
even if judges rarely acknowledge it. Corporate law is in the business of
sustaining business and that criterion will ultimately trump any single
constituency's claims to primacy or decisionmaking authority-no matter how
theoretically compelling those claims may otherwise seem.
5. Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939).
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